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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff submits the following REPLY BRIEF pursuant to Rule 24
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. As required by said Rule Plaintiff
will address only new matters submitted by Defendant's BRIEF. Plaintiff
submits that there are six (6) items to be addressed:
1. Defendant's reference to th< refusal of the Emery County
Attorney to prosecute Plaintiff (Defendant's Brief at page 7);
2. Defendant's reference to impliedfindingsof fact (Defendant's
Brief at page 9);
3. Defendant's assertion that this Court cannot award custody to
Plaintiff (Defendant's Brief at page 10);
4. Defendant's citation of authority concerning her argument
regarding the tax dependency issue (Defendant's Brief at page 14);
5. Defendant's assertion that the trial court's division of property
and allocation of debt were within acceptable limits (Defendant' Brief
pages 16-19 under paragraphs numbered 8-10);
6.

Defendant's argument concerning Dr. Burgess' fee
1

(Defendant's Brief at page 20).
ARGUMENT
ITEM1
Prosecution by Emery County
At page 7 of her BRIEF Defendant references the failure of the
Emery County Attorney's Office to prosecute Plaintiff for statutory rape.
While this case was pending in the District Court the Defendant's
counsel tendered an opinion that criminal conduct had occurred by the
Plaintiff.

See attached in the Addendum as Exhibit la.

This

correspondence was submitted to the Emery County Attorney. Attached
as Exhibit lb is the initial response of the Deputy Emery County
Attorney.
Apparently, further information was submitted to the Emery County
Attorney. Mary Manley, Deputy Emery County Attorney, indicated to
Defendant, through counsel, that no prosecution would occur. That
correspondence is attached as Exhibit lc.
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ITEM 2
Implied Findings of Fact
At page nine (9) of her BRIEF Defendant argues that the trial court
imphcitly made certain factual findings. Defendant argues that the trial
court imphcitly found that the parties were capable of implementing joint
custody because he ordered joint custody.
Implicit factual findings have been discussed by this court. In
WiUey v. WiUey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996) this court accepted
an imphedfindingthat Ms. Willey was voluntarily underemployed. The
leading case on imphedfindingsis HaU v. HaU, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah
App. 1993). In HaU Judge Orme, writing for a unanimous court, said,
"Unstated findings can be implied if it is reasonable to
assume that the trial court actually considered the
controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to
resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the
factual determination it made."
In this case the trial court made a finding "that joint custody is
generally not appropriate where the parties, as here is evident have strong
disagreements between each other... ." (emphasis added) (FINDINGS
3

OF FACT, 4th unnumbered paragraph of paragraph 2 on page 3 of the
FINDINGS, transcript page 0369)1
Plaintiff argues this explicit finding made by the trial court is
contrary to the finding required by UCA Section 30-3-10.2 that "both
parties appear capable of implementing joint legal custody." There is no
basis to assume that the trial court made an implicit finding. Actually, the
trial court found that the parties were not capable of implementing joint
custody.
This court discussed implementation ofjoint custody over objection
of a party in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991).
In Thronson the trial court made a similar finding - that "there exists
substantial difficulty between the parties". The Thronson court held that
the trial court abused its discretion by imposing joint legal custody. In
remanding the case this court said the "choice in competing child custody
claims should instead be based on function-related factors."

'The MEMORANDUM DECISION and FINDINGS OF FACT are attached in the
ADDENDUM hereto as Exhibits 2 and 3 respectively.
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Continuing, this court said, "As a result, the findings herein will not
support an ultimate finding under Section 30-3-10 that child custody
should be placed with one parent or the other."
Plaintiff submits there is no basis to conclude that the trial court
herein made any "implicit findings".
ITEM 3
Direct Entry of Judgment
Defendant argues, at page 10 of her BRIEF, that this court should
return the matter to the trial court rather that direct entry of custody to
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has requested that this court award him custody of
Cory. This court has, on many occasions, indicated its authority to direct
an entry ofjudgment and has exercised that authority. In Willey, supra.
this court said,
Notwithstanding this, the right of review on appeal has its
purposes. . . . [This court] would be remiss in its
responsibility and this assured right of appeal would be
meaningless if it unquestioningly accepted all actions of the
trial court and remained insensitive to pleas to rectify
inequity or injustice. Consequently, the rule is that when it
is made to appear that the court has failed to correctly apply
principles of law or equity,... or that the judgment has so
5

failed to do equity that it manifests a clear abuse of
discretion, this court on review will take appropriate
corrective action in the interests of justice.
Continuing, Willey stated,
Rather than remanding again for the trial court to examine
these same issues, we will exercise our equitable power to
review the evidence directly regarding equitable matters,
and to make the necessary findings on the issues not reached
by the trial court. See Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913
(Utah 1978) (noting that appellate court can review evidence
and make its own findings in divorce proceeding, which is
in equity); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360,
361 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) ("On appeal, we have broad
equitable powers and are not necessarily bound or limited by
the trial court's findings."); Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d
669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("In reviewing a trial court's actions
in a divorce case, we are vested with broad equitable
powers."). To do otherwise would subject both parties to the
unwarranted necessity of once again presenting these
questions to the trial court.
It is interesting to note that in Willey this court seemed inclined to
direct an award of custody; however, after complete review, decided to
remand the issue. This observation is based on the statement that "As a
result, the findings herein will not support an ultimate finding under
Section 30-3-10 that child custody should be placed with one parent of
6

the other."
In Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979) the court
said, "Only where trial court action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute
an abuse of discretion should the appellate forum interpose its own
judgment."

Plaintiff submits the trial court's action in this case

concerning custody is "so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of
discretion".
Plaintiff submits that the FINDINGS of the trial court would
support an award of custody by this court to Plaintiff. For the reasons
stated in Plaintiffs BRIEF Plaintiff submits that this court should award
him custody of his son.
ITEM 4
Equitable Division
Defendant argues in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 on pages 16-19 of her
BRIEF that the trial court's division of property and allocation of debt are
within acceptable limits of the trial court's discretion.
The methodology of division of property and allocation of debt are
7

indicated in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) and HaU v.
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). In Burt this court said that
"equity should be the watchword as the trial court apportions property...
." Continuing, this court said,
On remand, the court should first properly categorize the
parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the
separate property of one or the other. Each party is
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property
and fifty percent of the marital property. But rather than
simply enter such a decree, the court should then consider
the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any be
shown, proceed to effect an equitable distribution in light of
those circumstances and in conformity with our decision.
That having been done, the final step is to consider whether,
following appropriate division of the property, one party or
the other is entitled to alimony.
In Hall v. Hall, supra, this court said,
Absent findings that would justify departure from the
presumptive rule of equal distribution, we reverse and
remand to give the trial judge an opportunity to enter
findings supporting the unequal distribution,...."
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused its discretion concerning
division of property and allocation of debt.

8

ITEM 5
Tax Dependent
On this issue Plaintiff notes that Defendant cites Hill v. Hill, 869
P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1994) as authority to support the trial court's ruling.
Plaintiff notes that the Hill case predates UCA Section 78-45-7.21 and is,
therefore, inapposite.
ITEM 6
Burgess Fee
The trial court ordered Plaintiff to pay the fee for the custody
evaluation when the evaluation was ordered. That fee was paid by the
Plaintiff. The fee that Plaintiff was ordered in the Decree to pay is with
reference to Dr. Burgess's presence in court on May 2,1996. Plaintiff,
by this portion of his REPLY, wants to make it clear that the trial court's
FINDING in paragraph 29 (transcript page 0384) and DECREE2 in
paragraph 26 (transcript page 0397) was with reference to her presence
on that day as the cost of the evaluation had already been paid by

2

The Decree is attached in the Addendum as Exhibit 4.
9

Plaintiff. Plaintiff's payment to Dr. Burgess for the evaluation was made
before the evaluation was released and deposited with the trial court.
Plaintiff made no further requests of Dr. Burgess and, also, made no
payment to her.
Dr. Burgess' presence on May 2,1996 was entirely the request of
Defendant.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff requests the relief indicated in his BRIEF.
DATED this

17

day of / ^

, 1998.

SCHINDLER
Attorney for PlaintiffAPPELLANT

J(3HNE.
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ADDENDUM
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EXHIBIT 1 - PROSECUTION

LAW OFFICES OF

AMANN & WRAY, L.C.
SUTTE 900
NINE EXCHANGE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-2230

FACSIMILE: (801) 323-0822

PAUL G.

AMANN

April 3, 1996
VIA FACSIMILE
John E. Schindler, Esq.
First Interstate Bank Bldg.
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501
RE:

Daley v. Daley
Case No. 6189

Dear Mr. Schindler:
I am in receipt of the documents you have faxed regarding your
Motion. I would like to again take this opportunity to give your
client the opportunity to avoid incurring additional expenses by
giving my client the value of the deductions which your client will
garner by claiming my client and half the value of the deduction
for their child.
The amount, as stated previously is $1047.
Otherwise, we will await Judge Halliday's ruling on the matter.
Additionally, even assuming we can resolve the tax matter, it
is likely that we will need a hearing on the Trans Am matter. My
client, as has previously been stated to you, has no knowledge of
its whereabouts. Therefore, I look forward to obtaining a date for
hearing in this regard and wish to again advise you that I will
bring the hearing for contempt at the same time—unless the couch
reappears.
Finally, in discussing this case with a fellow practitioner,
it has been brought to my attention that I should bring to your
attention, directly,, the potential conflict of interest involved in
this case. We understand that you are one of three prosecutors in
Carbon County. As part of the discovery in this matter we have
learned that your client may currently be involved in activities
violative of Utah law. Enclosed are the relevant sections of the
Utah Code which my client can attest your client has violated
and/or continues to violate, specifically pertaining to animal
cruelty.
Additionally, and more importantly, your pleadings
suggest a violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-401.
Lisa was born on
November 27, 1973. Cory was born on June 27, 1990. The parties
were married on July 24, 1990. Consequently, at the time of Cory's
conception, (approximately September 15, 1989), Lisa was but 15
years old and unmarried. Please accept this letter as notification
to the prosecutor for purposes of triggering § 76-1-303(3) of a
potential violation of § 76-5-401.

£xJU4 J ^

; '

APR 0 5 m

John Schindler
April 3, 1996
Page 2
Since this case was commenced, Lisa has consistently
maintained her position that she should be awarded the sole,
permanent care, custody and control of Cory. She also maintains
that she is entitled to guideline support, spousal support, and an
equitable distribution of the marital estate.
From her
perspective, in response to her legitimate claims, she has been
subjected to having her hair tested for controlled substances, her
personal and confidential medical records scrutinized, her being
falsely accused of criminal conduct, etc. In divorce cases there
likely will be some friction and significant issues that need to be
resolved. I fear that this case has developed a somewhat unique
and inappropriate tone, however. Lisa does not wish to further
damage the relationship between herself and the father of her
child. Nor does she wish to continue to dissipate the marital
estate by incurring significant attorneys' fees. I do not wish to
anger or alienate a fellow member of the bar, especially over what
should be a fairly routine divorce matter. We certainly do not
wish to prolong this matter and we therefore would like to maintain
the current trial date so that this matter may finally be resolved,
and will certainly appreciate the opportunity of working with you
towards a conclusion.
Thank you for your attention to these matters.
Very truly yours,

*aul G. Amann
cc:

client

PGA/cns
dom.a-e\daley\schi-S.ltr

.. APil 0 3 1995

EMERY COUNTY ATTORNEY
PO Box 249
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249
DAVID A BLACKWELL, County Attorney
MARY L. MANLEY, Deputy County Attorney

Telephone (801) 381-2543
FAX (801) 381-5644

April 18, 1996

Paul G. Amann
Amann & Wray, L C .
Attorneys at Law
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 9 0 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 1 1
John E. Schindler
Attorney at Law
First Interstate Bank Building
8 0 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 8 4 5 0 1
Re:
Case No.

Daley v. Daley
6189

Dear Counselors:
This letter is intended to notify the involved parties that I recently received a copy of a
correspondence from Paul G. Amann dated April 3, 1996, addressed to John E. Schindler, Esq.
This correspondence was provided to me by John E. Schindler. It is my understanding that
the correspondence was provided by Mr. Schindler in an effort to notify me of possible alleged
criminal violations involving Danny Daley as per the request of the letter.
Aside from this correspondence, I have received no other information from any of the parties
involved, either informally or by referral from the appropriate law enforcement agency,
regarding these matters. From the content of the letter, I wonder if there is not a mistaken
belief that Mr. Schindler is a prosecutor in the same county in which Mr. Daley is alleged to
have committed these offenses. I assume, without further information, that these offenses
are alleged to have been committed in Emery County - both parties' residence. Mr. Schindler,
of course, is a prosecutor in Carbon County. In any event, if it is desired that these matters
be investigated further, a formal complaint should be filed by the interested parties w i t h the
appropriate law enforcement agency so that it may be forwarded to the appropriate
prosecuting agency.
Sincerely,

Mafcy L. T w a n l e y ( ^ /
Deputy Emery County Attorney
MLM/tm

cdMlb

' n ' APR 1 d ;ocd

/f£J
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EMERY COUNTY ATTORNEY
P.O. Box 249
Castle Dale. Utah 64513-0249
Telephone (801) 381-2543
FAX (801) 381-5844
E-MAIL: bwe!!ef*1,co.emery.ut.us

DAVID A. BLACKWELL, County Attorney
MARY L MANLEY, Deputy County Attorney
ALLEN S. THORPE, Deputy County Attorney

June 6, 1996

Paul G, Amann
AMANN & WRAY
Attorneys at Law
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Danny Daley

Dear Mr, Amann:
This is in response to your letter. I misspoke when I stated that I would be filing a formal
denial of these charges. I had already filed one when I initially reviewed the case just
shortly after it was filed. I suppose your tone and stance took me a little off guard as I do
not encounter it often with other members of the Bar. As you are not an attorney of record
in this case, and as I am sure you can appreciate, I have an obligation of privacy to those
not charged. Therefore, you will not be receiving that denial,
I will indicate to you, however, that I believe the statute of (imitations has run on this case.
Ms. Daley made a complaint for Unlawful Sexual Intercourse; not Rape of a Child. She was
clearly fifteen years of age at the time - not under fourteen - nor were there any facts
presented to me in her statement regarding enticement or coercion.
As a personal note, I think that at the time this offense occurred, it would have been
appropriate for an Unlawful Sexual Intercourse charge. I am sure that Ms. Daley has had
to pay an unfortunate price for some very poor decisions made on her behalf. Clearly, at
fifteen she couldn't be expected to appreciate the high likelihood that her relationship with
Mr. Daley would end up as it has. I assume her parents must have authorized her marriage
to him, which may not have been the best choice for her. I suppose we all do the best we
know how to do for our children and when we know better we do better.
In any event, I did staff this case with my supervisor when it was originally presented and
it was the consensus that this case not be charged.
Sincerely,

-o^W^i -rf^JWMary L. Manley
Deputy Emery County
MLM/tm

ULMlc

EXHIBIT 2 - MEMORANDUM DECISION

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
DANNY P. DALEY,

:
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

LISA D. DALEY,

i
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Civil No. 6189

This matter was before the Court for trial on the divorce
matter as well as on Orders to Show Cause by the parties seeking
that the Court find the Plaintiff in contempt for failing to
deliver personal property and/or pay support and alimony payments,
and the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking contempt against
the Defendant for failing to sign the tax return for 1995 and/or
allowing Plaintiff the exemption of the minor, Cory Daley.
Both parties seek a divorce herein and the Court concludes
that there is evidence before the Court to find grounds for
granting the divorce to each party and therefore a mutual divorce
is ordered.
With regard to custody of the minor child of the parties
hereto the Court concludes that Cory is issue of this marriage,
although born prior to the marriage of the parties herein, but
during the time the parties cohabited.

The Court concludes from

the evidence that the Defendant herein is the primary care giver in

2

this marital relationship and specifically relies upon the fact
that during the stormy periods of this marriage the Defendant was
always the one who took the child and cared for the child during
the various periods of separation from the Plaintiff herein.

The

Court would, based upon that evidence as well as the age of the
child, place the custody
visitation

privileges

to

in the mother and
the

father.

award reasonable

However,

under

the

circumstances and the testimony, the Court is concerned about the
Defendant's drug use and believes that counseling and in-patient
therapy

should be part and parcel of the orders herein.

I

therefore conclude that at the present time it is best to award
joint custody to these parties of the minor child, placing the
physical custody of the child with the father herein, Danny Daley,
subject to reasonable visitation privileges on the part of the
mother.

The Court requires as a condition for exercise of those

reasonable visitation privileges, which at a minimum should reflect
the minimum schedule set forth in the statutory framework for
visitation, that the Defendant undertake and successfully complete
drug and/or alcohol therapy on an in-patient basis if available and
if same can be paid, or partially paid for, under the terms and
provisions of the Plaintifffs medical insurance.

In the event that

all of the costs of that therapy cannot be paid for under the
insurance then the remaining balance should be paid by the parties

3

on the same percentage basis as the Court allocates for purposes of
child

support

hereafter

referred

to.

Upon

the

successful

completion of therapy by the Defendant the Court orders joint
custody be implemented by the parties to assure maximum time with
each of the parents considering the following circumstances.

The

father is, and has been, the providing parent and is presently tied
up working and should continue to provide for the support of the
child and/or the mother, since they are dependent on his efforts,
but he should be allowed his fifty percent of the time on the basis
of that working schedule to the extent possible.

This does not

require, however, the Defendant give up all weekend time with the
child but will necessitate adjustments by the parties as best they
can agree.

The Court is cognizant that joint custody is generally

not appropriate where the parties, as here is evident, have strong
disagreements between each other, however, because of what the
Court perceives to be the inability of either party to adequately
and appropriately care for the child alone, the Court concludes
that both of their best efforts will be needed to assure the
child's continued development but I believe the best interest of
the child requires this action under these circumstances.

I am

especially concerned that the surrogate parents or other family
members will become substitute parents for this child if these
parents do not learn to cooperate for the best interest of the
child.

4

I believe it proper in this case to authorize and order that
random drug scans of either party at the request of the other party
be required, provided that the other party pays for the test.

This

provision to remain in force and effect even after Ms. Daley
completes counseling required above.
The general pre-dilection of the Court favoring the natural
parents custody over substitute parents again weighs heavily in
favor of the joint arrangement herein provided.
This case is replete with incidents when one or the other
parent uses the child to badger the other (e.g., the name-calling
incidents referred to by the Evaluator and on the tape filed herein
as Exhibit No. 23), or gain some perceived benefit or control over
the other parent (such as failure to "timely" pay support and/or
alimony; and refusal to "timely" furnish an "operable" motor
vehicle).
The Court's task has been made more difficult by what I
perceive is the conscious effort by both parties to keep me in the
dark.

Never have I had so many unresolved issues of such minor

significance, for instance:
1.
stolen?
from

Where is the 1988 Pontiac Grand Am?

Why report it

Why report the car theft from Plaintiffs house and not

where

possession?

it was taken?
Who knows?

present to testify?

Did

Plaintiff

follow

and

retake

Someone must know, why weren't they
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2.

Where is the missing sectional of the couch?

3.

Where is the dagger?

4.

Where are the guns?

The testimony indicates that both of these individuals have
multiple ways or means of knowing what the other one is doing and
has been doing.
issues

favorable

Why can Plaintiff remember minor details about
to his

claims but

only

knows

the borrowed

$8,500.00 was spent on bills (unnamed and unspecified).
borrowing $8,500.00 necessary?
Statement?

Why is

Is it to restructure his Financial

Why is a change from eight dependents to two necessary

in the middle of a divorce?

Except to restructure his Financial

Statement.
I

conclude

that both parties

are

less than

forthright,

immature, and constantly attempting to present themselves in the
most favorable light while at the same time belittling the other,
and both therefore lack credibility in the Court's eyes.
The Court is nevertheless confident that the child has strong
and meaningful attachments to both of the parties herein and I wish
to encourage the continuation of those positive connections.

Upon

the Defendant's successful completion of an in-patient program or
the equivalent of a thirty to sixty-day in-patient program, and
upon her establishing her own individual place of residence, the
Court, upon the request of either party, will order a hearing be
held to establish whether the custody arrangements should be

6

modified.

In

the

event

that

no

successful

completion

accomplished the original placement herein shall continue.

is
The

Court specifically reserves this question so that no change of
circumstances need be shown on either side.
The Court concludes that for purposes of child support the
Plaintiff's base salary is $3,432.00, computed as follows: $19.30
per hour times 40 hours per week times 4.3 weeks per month, and the
same shall be the wage used for the Plaintiff in determining, under
the Uniform Guidelines, the minimum support payments to be made
and/or received.

The Court further finds that the Defendant, but

for

and

the

therapy

treatment

which

the

Court

concludes

is

necessary and was brought upon by the Defendant's own conduct, is
employable and should be charged with earning a minimum wage and
same should be attributed

to her in determining the amount of

child support payable by the parties herein.

Worksheets to be

provided accordingly.
The Court concludes that this family situation justifies the
Court not granting the divorce become final for six months from the
date of this Memorandum Decision to allow the parties to complete
and/or accomplish the requirements set forth herein and to continue
the medical coverage for payment of the medical expenses incurred
and/or to be incurred by the parties.

7

The Plaintiff
medical

:

- ordered to keep in f*: ' force and effect all

coverage

I

il ie I ei n J. 1111.

reasonable cost through his employment until the divorce becomes
final six months from -• - .

In -

event that there are unpaid

medical expenses acci
pay their proportionate share
the Support Worksheets.
shall continue

the same proportion as found

m

Upon the divorce becoming final Plaintiff

insurance

iiiy.

hi I l

employer so long as same is available

reasonable cost,

event ^hn* Defendant becomes employed she should provide insurance
(secondary) -..
at reasonable

*-.: .::...
vosr

i.

.ersel f- •-

ne parties

to pa

prescription, dentist, wo. ^ike costs i..

ali unpaid

medica^,

^...^ percentages as

support payments.
Plaintiff should be allowed to purchase from the Defendant the
dependency

allocation

computation

i.

'

'

*

"ax purposes,
* Iruil

such

« "Mvi Mis as a

single parent and ric ^* the oasis ui changed circumstances ii i the
event that the Defendant remarries.
1 1 i e ZQ\ i t ! • 3i i : 1 i ici'ii
in

Plaintiff's

gifts,

to-wit:

si 10 t gun,

Mi

-

proposal

which P l a i n t n f

the

rifle,

lufl

I i l „, M M

d a g g e r and s h e a t h ,

claims

t h e Browning

...

••
were

'

^roperty

pre-marital

rifle,

Il >" l IN I ' l l M i a r q e r and u n d i i

s h o u l d be awarded t o ttv,j P l a i n t i f i a s

-* : ;
-~
t

%

:...T.;..

German
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marital property separate and apart from the division hereafter
referred to.

The requested division as set forth in Plaintiff's

proposal as hereafter modified, should be confirmed by the Court,
but allowing the Defendant to select either list, and from the
properties listed in the other (non-selected) list, at values set
forth by Plaintiff, she may select any six items she chooses and
substitute any six items from her list of equal value.

The Court

does this on the basis of Plaintiff's testimony that he would
accept either one of the lists, provided that the properties were
in the same condition as they were at the time of separation,
normal wear and tear excepted.
The Court is convinced by the evidence that the items listed
in Plaintiff's list designated "Defendant's Personal Property1'
including the Ruger 9mm handgun, the .12 gauge shotgun, the Ruger
.264 magnum, the Ruger mini 14-223, and the Remington .22-250,
disappeared as testified to by Plaintiff all at the same time, and
since subsequently Plaintiff found one of the items in a pawn shop
with the Defendant's signature on the pawn ticket, all said items
should be attributed to the Defendant and should remain as charges
at the value set forth in Plaintiff's proposal against Defendant
unless

"discovered" and returned and mutually divided by the

parties.

9

The lists of personal property between which Defendant : s. -_w

1 and are modified as follows:
1.

Property listen

- Defendant s Summary

:r Persona;

.^ ^

Propex

be added tc s a n *:s- -r values

<•- .n Defendant s Summary, to-..-.

FF,

*fi<

"

""

"

"'

ar<~ ^D also AA at $15"*

v ai ,
HH (Court determines from evidence belongs iu Piainrj.fr and nave
s^o^'d W

only nominal/sentimental '^ \e

~e included

- either

•

lis

belong to Plaintiff.
2.
a

;:

i

Property listed :i n Defendant"' s list is modi fied by

-«--:

*

,,.

proposed distribution, Exhibit N
*

T
C ^

H ^»n^ "^

*

ir_i designated therein a^ j,
r,'}*-

r../ . r actually delivered

. ...

0

shoui 1 go wit:, \::tr : -^ . property.
the items belonging *• c^r*/

Sa^a list should be reuuced oy

: sted in Defendant's Exhibit

Those items ar • =

y

physical custodian's residence.
3.
i-' I,I I
above.

' As above indicated whichever list Defendant chooses

i i|i|ii"rprispf1

hi"," iht-

ill ii

if "inns previously alluded to
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4.

The value of Plaintiff's list should be reduced by

the Banshee ATV and Defendant's increased by same,
5.

The

1988 Pontiac valued

at

$3,000.00 shall be

attributed to Defendant and shall come off any list awarded to
Plaintiff if otherwise on same.
Decree of Divorce shall contain provisions as requested by
Defendant in paragraphs 21, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 55 of Defendant's
Exhibit No. 21.
The Court cannot conclude from the evidence who has the
Pontiac

Grand

Am

but

the

evidence

is

clear

surreptitiously took possession from Plaintiff.

that

Defendant

Since, from the

evidence, it was last in her possession before its disappearance it
is her burden to convince the Court of its present owner or
whereabouts.
that

Since Defendant has failed to convince this Court

Plaintiff

has retaken possession

the

Court, finding

it

Defendant's burden to do so, attributes the $3,000.00 Pontiac Grand
Am to the Defendant herein.
Since the Plaintiff is, at this stage, the only real wageearner, the Court orders that the Plaintiff pay the debts as
follows: Those debts listed under paragraph A, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
and 8 of Plaintiff's proposal as well as those items listed under
B, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Plaintiff's proposal.

To the

extent that the doctor bills are not paid by Plaintiff's insurance

and

to t h e extent that they were

incurred

separati' ' >

after

the date

:

She ^na„ also pay d.; other individual debts incurred after

same-

the separation date.
1

.

,

/

g r e a t e r value of personal property after t h e selection
Defendant herein as above outlined,
Plain!

ill

II, i t .

in I I i ii ii i I

i I i il i !

I il

the Court orders that the
I1 ni in I |

i ni ni I

o b l i g a t i o n s which he ultimately pays out-of-pocket r against the
personal property list
a

i5

th =

thereby reducing the value :r r. .s . :sr

= .1 i ::iai i :i/

p a y m e n t s m a d e for doctors and/or hospitalization
insurance carrier,

other party one-half

K.

i * L .

Court

Plaintiff's

After all t h e foregoing adjustments, t h e party

rec e i ^ i :i: lg !
::: I: I a. g r eatat.

The

.; <

• e

:>; t h e d i f f e r e n c e

concludes

that

the

in value.

real

property

owned

the

r^

e

valued at

trie oi-.ii c.

$53,50C

':

c payoff value

d a t e of t h e h e a r i n g h e r e i n was some $ 4 7 , 0 1 6 - 0 0 making
v.i1u i

.'is-

MI

Plaintiff

*u l n I I mi ni
to t:

11II w h i c h

Defendant f o r t h w i t h ,

c o n c l u d e s t h e ';\0>K:
,=ind 111 i I"I|'i I i "in

mi i t i l l l

:

M

tlidL

should

an,equitable
p a :i I

n i. VJ., -Mmi C I)

; jdi i" c l a i m e d by P l a i n t i f f
estate.

1: e

-^ .^: t h e

b]

the

n le Zciiii: t

was n o t a l o a n
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The home is to be awarded to the Plaintiff subject to the
obligations herein described and the Plaintiff shall have a lien
against

the home

for the payment

of

all

obligations

herein

outlined.
The Court concludes that the Plaintiff borrowed $8,500.00
which he claims to have applied toward debt but which he gave no
clear accounting of any monies actually paid by the Plaintiff for
the marital estate's benefit.

The Court therefore orders one-half

of the value of the amount withdrawn to be paid by the Plaintiff to
the Defendant at the rate of $100.00 per month, no interest to be
charged in the event that payments are made in a timely fashion on
or before the 5th day of each month beginning with the month
following this Memorandum Decision.
The

Court

concludes

that

the

Defendant

is

in need

of

assistance in providing for her support and further that the
Plaintiff has the ability to pay and hereby orders that the
Plaintiff pay to the Defendant the sum of $200.00 per month as and
for alimony, the same to continue for a five year period equivalent
to the time the parties were married, to-wit: from July 24,1990 to
the date of separation, to-wit: July 28, 1995, or until the
happening of an event which statutorily authorizes the termination
of alimony occurs, whichever event first occurs.
Plaintiff shall have as his own separate property, free from
any claim by the Defendant thereon, any and all of his retirement

13

programs

including any and al 1 w i t h d r a w a l s t h e r e f r o m during the

m a r t ] .n j

,, ,I.M, J I n w

i i in I m i i i n |

I In

I l i in in i i in i

I i i ITIPI I I

'Defendant, but shall c o n t i n u e any life i n s u r a n c e < :>n his life as a
b e n e f i t nf employment w h e r e the m i n o r child

is beneficiary

until

t
Defendant shall be solely and separately liable for payment of
the Colonial Bank Mastercard account and any and all debts incurred
b . lln

I ie tiendiiiil

H l i i I In

epai* i t i \ in

In I

'

ll'i n

PM?ep t: med i ::a 1

as a b o v e referred t o .
The

Cour*~ oelieves

pa^ ;_*••?-

from, the t e s t i m o n y

that

neither

or

rne

>r till i! :i gh t ; i :i t i l t h • = .• • 2 : n :i r t a i v I • :):i : •

.

T h e e v i d e n c e leads the C o u r t to c o n c l u d e t h a t the Plaintiff

*
has

u s e d e v e r y effort to d i s g u i s e m o n i e s and a s s e t s w h i c h he has had
a v'aila bJI • i-i

L ::: ! hi i ill

i

i € .b t s

: -r

r

* —persona-. ^^^ ^^

obligations and not as money taken for
benefit.

T h e Court b e l i e v e s some ol the t e s t i m o n y would indicate

t

* '

that such is L..er Jd^-.j

Based upcu i..^ . n a L x ^ t : , _w

r e l a t i v e t j the exa," a m o u n t s of
ir * *
parties,

^^

** -

M^i^~

credits a n d / o r d e b t s , the Court

:

a-

obligations

alimony and/or suppor t whic 1 i I I DeIieve I n

a d d r e s s e s both parties c l a i m s fairly.
1 •
i n d e b t e d n e s s .:

-i
...^ p a r t i e s .

landings

i 3 ] tairnea:=

T h e C o u r t has reduced the
' ivard b e c a u s e jf the la rge

. - -

n t: i :i la t I: !: ie leb t: s • .] •
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satisfied

other

than

by

the

payment

thereof

by

Plaintiff

(bankruptcy, etc.) I reserve the right to re-visit the amount of
alimony awarded.
As is obvious to the parties herein, the Court had originally
planned on relying upon recommendations of Dr. Burgess and her
custody/home evaluations.

However, both parties chose to eliminate

her continued involvement and the Court has been disadvantaged
thereby.

I note that no provision has been made for payment of the

fees incurred in the evaluation other than the Court's initial
order.

The Court, because of the Defendant's inability to pay at

this time and the need for making a speedy and just provision for
payment of the entire obligation incurred, the same having been
"ordered" by the Court, now orders the Plaintiff herein to pay any
balance thereon.
It is clear that Defendant is in need of assistance for
payment of attorney fees herein also.
the total value of attorney

The Court is concerned that

fees accumulated

in this matter,

because of what appears to the Court to be the less than forthright
conduct of the parties, is considerably greater than the normal
fees for such a divorce.

Based upon the Court's overall decision

herein the Court concludes that the Plaintiff should pay to the
Defendant for the benefit of her attorney $5,000.00 of the claimed
attorney fees up to and including the date of trial, and Defendant

should

pay

subsequent I

the

balance

including

all

costs, etc., incurred

I i i ni I .

Plaintiff's attorney is directed to prepare Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, anc
appi"'! i

mi I

I

„i| |;

Decree n: Divorce and submit same for

11

r

signature.
DATED this^

2 L day of

XSJ&<<&tM±

, 1997,

''BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
District Court
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^ CUA^

1

a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION
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John E. Schindler
Attorney at Law
First Interstate Bank Bldg,
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501
Michael J. Wray
Attorney at Law
9 Exchange Place, #900
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EXHIBIT 3 - FINDINGS OF FACT

^o

JOHN E. SCHINDLER, #3 619
Attorney for Plaintiff,
8 0 West Main, Suite 2 01
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone (801) 637-1783
in

i MI

- '

SEVENTH DISTRICT
COURT/EMERY

1,111111

nun

i !>,i

m

vn

i

r com

i

i

EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DANN\

DALEY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Vs.
LISA „. DALEY,

Civil No. 6189
Honorable Bruce K. Hall.

Defendant.
T h i s

niii I I

i" i, 11 ni I I

6 ;

May 24, 1996; August 23, 1996, and October
Bruce K. Halliday presiding.

Honoraole

The Plaintiff was personally present
The Defendant was

personally present with «. ~ counsel

record, Michael

7-rav.

The Court received testimony and exhibits and having reviewed and
informed and having
issued a Memorandum Decision now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I

Ill" I III | hi r ties seek: a divorce herein and the Court concludes

that 'there IL. evidence before

the Cour

granting the divorce to each party and therefore a mutual divorce

With regard to custody ut Uie m m n ", I
hereto

Court concludes that Cory
in in | ii i i l

.^ issue

I I > pdit.uji.
marriage,

M l n niiirr i aqe ui une parties herein, but

during the time the parties cohabited.

The Court concludes from

the evidence that the Defendant herein is the primary care giver in
this marital relationship and specifically relies upon the fact
that during the stormy periods of this marriage the Defendant was
always the one who took the child and cared for the child during
the various periods of separation from the Plaintiff herein.
The Court would, based upon that evidence as well as the age
of the child, place the custody in the mother and award reasonable
visitation

privileges

to

the

father.

However,

under

the

circumstances and the testimony, the Court is concerned about the
Defendant's drug use and believes that counseling and in-patient
therapy should be part and parcel of the orders herein.
I therefore conclude that at the present time it is best to
award joint custody to these parties of the minor child, placing
the physical custody of the child with the father herein, Danny
Daley, subject to reasonable visitation privileges on the part of
the mother.
The Court requires as a condition for exercise of those
reasonable visitation privileges, which at a minimum should reflect
the minimum schedule set forth in the statutory framework for
visitation, that the Defendant undertake and successfully complete
drug and/or alcohol therapy on an in-patient basis if available and
if same can be paid, or partially paid for, under the terms and
provisions of the Plaintiff's medical insurance.
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0365

In the event that

a i l

11 ni

ii. i n

L'CILI! J

111

i 11 i i

! ii f i a p y

i

i

IIIIIIIIIIIIII

m

11 m 11 m

i 11 m

i n n mi i

i line

insurance then the remaining balance should be paid by the parties
on the same percentage basis as the Court allocates for purposes of
child

i rati

suppor "

completion

I ..

therapy by the Defendant the Court orders

int

custody be implemented by the parties to assure maximum time with
each • ::: f the p a r e nts consider i IMJ I In*. I Il I « 11 in | i, i, n

iioi'stanei, «

The

father i s , and h a s b e e n , t h e providing p a r e n t a n d is presently t i e d
up working and should continue to provide for the support of the
child and/or the mother, since they

dependen

^

but he should be allowed his fifty percent of the time on the basis
c

•i i

M, i-iri

| schedule i"

the extent possible

Th 1 ^ does not

require, however, the Defendant give ., ,ill weekend "
child

. '

^

necessitate adjustments by the parties as best they

c
The Court is cognizant that joint custody
appropriate where the parties, as here
disagreemeT

genera.

z

evident, have strong

between each other, however, because of what the

Court perceives to be the inability

, .uner part

adequately

and appropriately care for the child alone, the Court concludes
t

afforts will be needed

child's continued development but

assure the

relieve the best

the child requires this action under these circumstances.
especial!', concerned that the surrogate parents
members wiJI 1, become subst i I nil

|Jd,u»111s II in

f
am

^ other family

i ni

mil i i i iiuse

parents do not learn to cooperate for the best interest of the
child.
3.
that

I believe it proper in this case to authorize and order

random drug scans of either party at the request of the other

party be required, provided that the other party pays for the test.
This provision to remain in force and effect even after Ms. Daley
completes counseling required above.
4.
natural

The general pre-dilection of the Court favoring the
parents custody

over substitute parents again weighs

heavily in favor of the joint arrangement herein provided.
5.

This case is replete with incidents when one or the other

parent uses the child to badger the other (e.g., the name-calling
incidents referred to by the Evaluator and on the tape filed herein
as Exhibit No. 23), or gain some perceived benefit or control over
the other parent (such as failure to "timely" pay support and/or
alimony; and refusal to "timely" furnish an "operable" motor
vehicle).
6.

The Court's task has been made more difficult by what I

perceive is the conscious effort by both parties to keep me in the
dark.

Never have I had so many unresolved issues of such minor

significance, for instance:
A.
stolen?
from

Where is the 1988 Pontiac Grand Am?

Why report it

Why report the car theft from Plaintifffs house and not

where

it was

taken?

Did

- 4 -

Plaintiff

follow

and

retake

possession

" njwbi

present to

,I>M<JIJ,I

IN

I

I

I

I

I I

testify?
B.•

Where

C.

where

• *

h i s s i n g s e c t i o n a l of t h e c o u c h ?

D. • Where are the guns?
testimony indicates that both of these individuals have
multiple ways or means nl II' in JW I IKJ wlnl I In
has been doing.
issues

Why can Plaintiff remember minor details about

favorable

$8,500.00

„„.

-1"* i w n

•

^^

^

knows

spent

the borrowed

i f iHI 11 |i

borrowing $8,500.00 necessary?
Statement?

Iliidi mil' i ill m IIII | 1111 I

I J 1 :i;; , iii ,

Is it to restructure his Financial

Why is a change from eight dependents to two necessary

the middle of a divorce ?

Excep t t :: • i : 2. 5 t r i ic t: 1 1:1 : =1 h i 5 11? :i 1 lax n ::: i a Il

Statement.
I

::: • ::: 1 1, :: Jl " 11 :i =1 the t

I : : • th

parties

immature, and c o n s t a n t l y attempting
most favorable l i g h t while a t
ni ni ni in ii'iipnpf i r p

iric'ii

*-^p

forthright,

-.*.*•* :i;i- b e l i t t l i n g t h e o t h e r ,

credibil

*

••

""i^^'s

ncourage t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n

eyes*

connaem.

s t r o n g and m e a n i n g f u l a t t a c h m e n t s t o b o t h ;.

Defendant's successful

^^

present, uiemsei

The C o u r t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s

Upon

•-

t h e p a r t i e s h e r e i n and

• those positive

connections.

compj.e-

t h e e q u i v a l e n t of a t h i r t y t o s i x t y - d a y i n - p a t i e n t p r o g r a m , and
upon h e r e s t a b l i s h i n g
Court: „, upoi 11 tl le r e q u e s -

individual
:i : pai : !::;; •

place
1 i ] Il

residence,

the

held

to establish whether the custody arrangements should be

modified.

In

the

event

that

no

successful

completion

accomplished the original placement herein shall continue.

is
The

Court specifically reserves this question so that no change of
circumstances need be shown on either side.
8.

The Court concludes that for purposes of child support the

Plaintiff's base salary is $3,432.00, computed as follows: $19.80
per hour times 40 hours per week times 4.3 weeks per month, and the
same shall be the wage used for the Plaintiff in determining, under
the Uniform Guidelines, the minimum support payments to be made
and/or received.

The Court further finds that the Defendant, but

for

and

the

therapy

treatment

which

the Court

concludes

is

necessary and was brought upon by the Defendant's own conduct, is
employable and should be charged with earning a minimum wage and
same should be attributed

to her in determining the amount of

child support payable by the parties herein.

Worksheets to be

provided accordingly.
9.

The Court concludes that this family situation justifies

the Court not granting the divorce become final for six months from
the date of the Memorandum Decision to allow the parties to
complete and/or accomplish the requirements set forth herein and to
continue the medical coverage for payment of the medical expenses
incurred and/or to be incurred by the parties.
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10.

II •• I'l.i in

effect

a l l medical coverage .

Defendant and u i e c h i l d a v a i l a b l e a t

r e a s o n a b l e c o s t t h r o u g h h i s employment u n t i l t h e d i v o r c e becomes
1 j , 11 Li I

."iii

"
' 11

I i

d

medical expenses accrued hereunder Plaintiff anci Defendant shall
pay their proportionate share in the same proportion *.- found in
the Suppor t 1 :: rksheeL

iff

shall continue insurance coverage

r„: child with his

employer «=« 1 rTicj as same is available at reasonable cost

the

event that Jefendai :t t: becomes smplo} a I si I = 3h :::;" :i ] I

nee

(secondary) on the child and herself as long as same is available
at reasonable cost.

"he parties

^I: unpaid medical,

prescription, dentist,

s

support payments.
1]

Plaintiff

should

be allowed to purchase

,

Defendant the dependency
such computation to be made
a single parent and
the event M^..
12.

from the

the basis of Defendant's status as

on the basis of changed circumstances in

uetendan t

The Court concludes that the items listed as personal

property in Plaintiff's proposal which Plaintiff claims were prei

ire-marital

property separate and apart from the division hereafter referred
to, to-wit:
1. .308 rifle,
2. Browning .22 rifle;

3.
4.
5.
6.

.410 pump shotgun;
desk;
1973 Dodge Charger;
German dagger and sheath.

The requested division as set forth in Plaintiff's proposal as
hereafter modified, should be confirmed by the Court, but allowing
the Defendant to select either list, and from the properties listed
in the other (non-selected) list, at values set forth by Plaintiff,
she may select any six items she chooses and substitute any six
items from her list of equal value.

The Court does this on the

basis of Plaintiff's testimon

chat he would accept either one of

the lists, provided that the p

Gerties were in the same condition

as they were at the time of separation, normal wear and tear
excepted.
13.
listed

The Court is convinced by the evidence that the items
in

Plaintifffs

list

designated

"Defendant's

Personal

Property" including the Ruger 9mm handgun, the .12 gauge shotgun,
the Ruger .264 magnum, the Ruger mini 14-223, and the Remington
.22-250, disappeared as testified to by Plaintiff all at the same
time, and since subsequently Plaintiff found one of the items in a
pawn shop with the Defendant's signature on the pawn ticket, all
said items should be attributed to the Defendant and should remain
as charges at the value set forth in Plaintiff's proposal against
Defendant unless "discovered" and returned and mutually divided by
the parties.
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14. The lists of personal property between which Defendant is
to choose begins with the lists presented by Plaintiff in Exhibit
No. 1.
a.

The following is list No. 1 and should be awarded to

Plaintiff unless otherwise designated by Defendant except as may be
substituted by Defendant as above indicated:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

2 Dressers
1 queen size bed
1 kitchen table and four chairs
Washer and dryer
55 gallon fish tank
3 end tables
Old dishes and flatware
Black couch and love seat
TV
Ruger .22 semi-auto rifle
SKS Rifle (1)
Breadmaker (gift)
Five man tent
Weight bench
Plants (6)
Bicycle
Colt 380
Ruger Semi auto pistol
50 cassette tapes @ $8.00 ea
CD's 30 § $10.00 ea
Clock radio
Blender
Tool boxes
Miscellaneous tools
Blankets (4)
Vacuum
Utility trailer
Chevy truck
ATV
30. 1973 Dodge Challenger
31. Bicycle
TOTAL

- 9 -

$

300.00
400.00
200.00
150.00
100.00
70.00
70.00
300.00
150.00
180.00
100.00
100.00
150.00
40.00
150.00
250.00
200.00
400.00
300.00
15.00
15.00
25.00
150.00
60.00
300.00
1,000.00
2,500.00
2,500.00
150.00

$10,325.00

Property listed in Defendant's Summary of Personal Property
but not listed in Plaintiff's list (1. To Plaintiff) shall be added
to list No. 1 at values set in Defendant's Summary, to-wit:
EE.
GG.
II.
JJ.
KK.
LL.
MM.
NN.
00.
PP.
AA.
DD.

l chicken incubator
$
2 red/blue mine lights + 2 base chargers
1 silver and gold wedding ring
1 almond Whirlpool refrigerator
l Sharp stereo with 2 large speakers
1 black file cabinet
l stand for fish tank
2 sand dune paddlewheel tires
2 men's 4 wheeler racing gloves
1 AT&T telephone & answering machine
Misc. gun ammunition
Chickens
TOTAL

$2750.00

GRAND TOTAL LIST NO. 1
b.

850
250
150
80
275
75
125
180
40
75
150
500

$13,075.00

The following property is not marital property, to-wit:
BB.
FF.

Jumper cables
1 14x70 Nashua
w/chicken pens, etc

c. The following property belongs to Plaintiff and has only
nominal/sentimental value, to-wit:
HH. Misc. coins, silver bar
d.

1,000

The items listed above in sub paragraph b and c should not

be included in either list, except as hereafter provided, but if
they exist they should belong to Plaintiff.
e.
at

Property listed in Defendant's list is modified by adding

Defendant's

estimated values those

items reviewed

in her

proposed distribution, Exhibit No. 21, and designated therein as
S.
T.
U.

12 diamond wedding ring
4 burial plots
1 blue area rug
- 10 -

1,000.00
355.00
30.00

£37^

1 baby book
$800 cash taken from car
by Plaintiff
Y. 1 Black Hills gold anniversary ring
Z. 1 Pioneer home stereo (in La Verkin)
AA. 1 sand dune paddlewheel tires
BB. 2 women's 4 wheeler racing gloves
CC. Clothing and personal effects

w.

20..00

X.

TOTAL

800..00
100..00
700..00
180..00
40..00

$3225.00

but only if actually delivered to Defendant, otherwise the items
are deleted. Said list should be reduced by the items belonging to
Cory listed in Defendant's Exhibit No. 21.
to Cory

and go with him

Those items are awarded

to the primary physical

custodian's

residence.
f. The following is list No. 2 and should be awarded to
Defendant unless otherwise designated by Defendant except as may be
substituted by Defendant as above indicated.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Red plastic gas can
5.00
Large older radio and
phonograph in wood cabinet
Tools - socket set 3/8-drive
50.00
Wrenches - screwdrivers
60.00
Large box of children's books (new) 35.00
Black metal rocking chair
100.00
30.00
Power drill
Space heater, bathroom scales (20
80.00
All records, titles, deeds, tax papers
receipts, etc.
Electric jeep (1) Three wheeler (1) 360.00
Blue sectional couch
1,200.00
Large home stereo in wood cabinet
400.00
Tan filing cabinet
40.00
Four or five blankets
75.00
Two handmade quilts
25 gallon fish tank
100.00
Cassette tapes (100 at $8.00 ea)
800.00
New Eureka vacuum
100.00
15-20 video movies
150.00
New cassette player
15.00
Phone
40.00
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22. Clock radio
23. New dishes
24. Green clean machine
(carpet cleaner)
25. Family pictures
26. Nice glasses
26. Glass bowls
27. New Smith-Corona
Electronic typewriter
28. New silverware in wood box
29. Motorcycle helmet
30. Bushnell Binoculars
31. Minolta Camera
32. Hitachi Camcorder
33. Clothes hamper
34. Cordless phone
35. Battery charger
36. Bicycle
37. Answering machine
38. Flashlights (2)
39. Wall decorations
40. Cherry wood jewelry box
41. Captiva Camera
42. Christmas decorations
43. Ruger 989 9mm hand gun
44. 12 gauge shot gun
45. Ruger 264 Magnum
46. Ruger Mini 14-223
47. Remington 22-250
48. RCA VCR
49. Oak coffee table
50. Towels - sheets, etc.
51. Plants and plant stands
(brass and glass)
52. Lamps
53. End tables
54. Kitchen table - four chairs
55. Microwave
56. Two dressers
57. Compact discs (120 @ $10.00 ea)
58. Cannon 35 mm camera
2 lenses and case
59. Miscellaneous gun ammo
60. Jumper cables
61. 1988 Pontiac Grand Am
62.. Banshee ATV

400.00
150.00
15.00
3,000.00
2,500.00

TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL LIST NO. 2

$17,750.00
$20,975.00
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15.00
50.00
110.00
40.00
40.00
300.00
300.00
150.00
50.00
130.00
650.00
5.00
40.00
30.00
150.00
30.00
15.00
200.00
130.00
130.00
60.00
400.00
350.00
600.00
600.00
500.00
350.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
40.00
80.00
250.00
150.00
300.00
1,200.00

g. The water share listed as Item V should go with real
property.
h.

As above indicated whichever list Defendant chooses is to

be increased by the value of guns previously alluded to above.
i.

The value of Plaintiff's list should be reduced by the

Banshee ATV and Defendant's increased by same.
j.
Pontiac

The Court cannot conclude from the evidence who has the
Grand

Am

but

the

evidence

is

clear

surreptitiously took possession from Plaintiff.

that

Defendant

Since, from the

evidence, it was last in her possession before its disappearance it
is her burden to convince the Court of its present owner or
whereabouts.

Since Defendant has failed to convince this Court

that Plaintiff has retaken possession, the Court, finding it
Defendant's burden to do so, awards the $3,000.00 Pontiac Grand Am
to the Defendant herein.
The

1988

Pontiac

valued

at

$3,000.00

shall

remain

on

Defendant's list and shall come off any list awarded to Plaintiff
if otherwise on same.
k.

These items are awarded to Cory and go with him to the

primary custodian's residence, to wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.,
7.
8.
9.
10.

1 Dresser
Single Mattress
Sega and Games
Baby car seat
2 baseball bats
2 Softball mitts
1 twin bed
1 baby swing
1 baby stroller
Large box of children's books
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11. 1 Crib (sold in

1992)

12. Cory's full size bed
15.
by

Decree of Divorce shall contain provisions as requested

Defendant

in paragraphs

21, 50, 51,

52, 53, and

55 of

Defendant's Exhibit No. 21 as follows:
a.(21)

The Defendant should make arrangements to receive

the child at the time he is to be returned and the Plaintiff should
cooperate in this regard.
b.(50) Name Change: The Defendant should have her maiden
name of Olsen restored to her.
c. (51) Inheritance: All property and all property rights
which

may be vested

in either party as a result of family

inheritance, trusts, or similar sources should be awarded to the
party from whose family it came.
d. (52) Documents: Each party should be ordered to execute
and deliver to the other such documents

as are required to

implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the
Court.
e. (53) Default: In the event either party to this action
defaults in any obligations imposed by the Decree which is entered
by the Court, the party in default shall be liable to the other
party for all reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees and
costs, incurred in the enforcement of the obligations created by
the Decree.
f. (55)
enjoined

The parties shall be permanently restrained and

from bothering, harassing,
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annoying, threatening, or

harming the other parent or the minor child at their place of
residence, employment, school, or any other place.
16.

Since the Plaintiff is, at this stage, the only real

wage-earner the Court orders that the Plaintiff pay the debts as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Zions Bank Mastercard
$2,237
Zions Bank Visa
1,100
Zions BAnk (Lumina)
9,000
ORS
Greentree Acceptance
Desert View Credit Union
700
(Grand Am Repair)
Desert View Credit Union
7,000
(Chevy Pickup)
Discover Card
3,200
Dr. Wayne Brown
Dr. Jeffery Palen
Southeastern Radiology
Leo Hardy
Utah Valley Medical Center
Castle View Hospital
Accounts Receivable Management
Any debt incurred after separation on July 28, 1995.
TOTAL

17.

18.

$23,237

Defendant should assume and pay the following debts:
A.
B.

Colonial Bank Mastercard
Castleview Hospital

3,950;

C.

Any debt incurred after separation on July 28, 1995.

To the extent that the doctor bills are not paid by

Plaintiff's insurance and to the extent that they were incurred
after the date of separation, to-wit: July 29, 1995, the Defendant
is ordered to pay same.
19.

Defendant shall also pay all other individual debts

incurred after the separation date.
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20.

To the extent that the Plaintiff receives a substantially

greater value of personal property after the selection by the
Defendant herein as above outlined, the Court orders that the
Plaintiff be allowed a credit of one-half the value of all of the
obligations which he ultimately pays out-of-pocketr

against the

personal property list, thereby reducing the value of his list visa-vis the Defendant's list.

This does not include insurance

payments made for doctors and/or hospitalization by Plaintiff's
insurance carrier.
21.

After all the foregoing adjustments, the party receiving

the greatest value of personal property shall pay to the other
party one-half of the difference in value.
22.

The Court concludes that the real property owned by the

parties, as stipulated in open court by the parties, is to be
valued at the sum of $53,500.00, that the payoff value as of the
date of the hearing herein was some $47,016.00 making an equitable
value of $6,484.00, one-half of which should be paid by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant forthwith, that is $3,240.00. The Court
concludes the $3,000.00 "loan" claimed by Plaintiff was not a loan
and no obligation of the marital estate.
23.

The home including the water share is to be awarded to

the Plaintiff subject to the obligations herein described and the
Plaintiff shall have a lien against the home for the payment of all
obligations herein outlined.
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24.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiff borrowed $8,500.00

which he claims to have applied toward debt but which he gave no
clear accounting of any monies actually paid by the Plaintiff for
the marital estate's benefit.

The Court therefore orders one-half

of the value of the amount withdrawn to be paid by the Plaintiff to
the Defendant at the rate of $100.00 per month, no interest to be
charged in the event that payments are made in a timely fashion on
or before the 5th day of each month beginning with the month
following this Memorandum Decision.
25.

The Court concludes that the Defendant is in need of

assistance in providing for her support and further that the
Plaintiff has the ability to pay and hereby orders that the
Plaintiff pay to the Defendant the sum of $200.00 per month as and
for alimony, the same to continue for a five year period equivalent
to the time the parties were married, to-wit: from July 24,1990 to
the date of separation, to-wit: July 28, 1995, or until the
happening of an event which statutorily authorizes the termination
of alimony occurs, whichever event first occurs.
26.

Plaintiff shall have as his own separate property, free

from any claim by the Defendant thereon, any and all of his
retirement programs, including any and all withdrawals therefrom
during the marriage and specifically including the $14,000.00
claimed by Defendant, but shall continue any life insurance on his
life

as

a

benefit

of

employment

where

the

beneficiary until the minor reaches his majority.
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minor

child

is

27.

Defendant shall be solely and separately liable for

payment of the Colonial Bank Mastercard account and any and all
debts incurred by the Defendant after the separation July 28, 1995
except medical as above referred to.
28.

The Court believes from the testimony that neither of the

parties have been forthright with the Court and/or with each other.
The evidence leads the Court to conclude that the Plaintiff has
used every effort to disguise monies and assets which he has had
available to him as debts and/or necessary payments on marital
obligations and not as money taken for his own personal use and/or
benefit.

The Court believes some of the testimony would indicate

the contrary but cannot find by a preponderance of the evidence
that such is the case.

Based upon the inability to make findings

relative to the exact amounts of credits and/or debts, the Court
made adjustments with regard to the claimed obligations of the
parties, alimony and/or support which I believe in all fairness
addresses both parties claims fairly.

The Court has reduced the

level of alimony that I would normally award because of the large
indebtedness of the parties.
satisfied

other

than

by

In the event that the debts are

the

payment

thereof

by

Plaintiff

(bankruptcy, etc.) I reserve the right to re-visit the amount of
alimony awarded.
29.

As is obvious to the parties herein, the Court had

originally planned on relying upon recommendations of Dr. Burgess
and her custody/home evaluations.

However, both parties chose to
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eliminate

her

continued

disadvantaged thereby.

involvement

and

the

Court

has been

I note that no provision has been made for

payment of the fees incurred in the evaluation other than the
Court's initial order.

The Court, because of the Defendant's

inability to pay at this time and the need for making a speedy and
just provision for payment of the entire obligation incurred, the
same having been "ordered" by the Court, now orders the Plaintiff
herein to pay any balance thereon.
30.

It is clear that Defendant is in need of assistance for

payment of attorney fees herein also.

The Court is concerned that

the total value of attorney fees accumulated in this matter,
because of what appears to the Court to be the less than forthright
conduct of the parties, is considerably greater than the normal
fees for such a divorce.

Based upon the Court1s overall decision

herein, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff should pay to the
Defendant for the benefit of her attorney $5,000.00 of the claimed
attorney fees up to and including the date of trial, and Defendant
should

pay

the

balance

including

all

costsf

etc.,

incurred

subsequent to trial.
Having made and entered the above Findings of Pact, the Court
now makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the
subject matter hereof.
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2.

The Court's Findings are reasonable and should be adopted

as the order of this Court.
DATED this^l£p3ay of

vSTZ^^Z^-H

, 1997.

District Court Judgev

Daley\Findings\sm
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER, #3 619
Attorney for Plaintiff,
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone (801) 637-1783
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DANNY P. DALEY,
Plaintiff,

i

Vs.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

LISA D. DALEY,
C i v i l No. 6189
Honorable Bruce K.

Defendant.

Halliday

This matter came before the Court for trial on May 2, 1996;
May 24, 1996; August 23, 1996, and October 1, 1996, the Honorable
Bruce K. Halliday presiding.

The Plaintiff was personally present

with his counsel of record, John E. Schindler.

The Defendant was

personally present with her counsel of record, Michael H. Wray.
The Court received testimony and exhibits and having reviewed and
considered same and being otherwise fully informed and having
issued a Memorandum Decision and made and entered Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Divorce:

Each party is awarded to a Decree of Divorce,

one from the other.
20,1997.

The divorce shall not be final until July

All other terms and conditions of the Decree shall become

effective upon entry by the Clerk in the Registry of Actions which
shall occur immediately.
2. Custody/Visitation; Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby

awarded the joint custody of their minor child, Cory.

Plaintiff is

awarded the primary physical custody of Cory subject to reasonable
visitation by the Defendant which, at a minimum, is the minimum
schedule set forth in the statutory framework upon the condition
that the Defendant undertake and successfully complete a thirty
(30) to sixty (60) day drug and/or alcohol program on an in-patient
basis.
Joint custody as ordered herein shall continue until further
order of the court.

3.

Subsequent Custody Qrder; The order of joint custody

hereby implemented may be revisited on motion of either party after
Defendant completes in-patient drug/alcohol counseling as above
required without a showing of a substantial change of material
circumstances.
4.

Defendants Drug Treatment: As a condition to Defendant's

visitation of the child, Defendant will enter into and successfully
complete a thirty (30) to sixty (60) day in-patient drug/alcohol
program which will be paid for by the insurance coverage provided
by Plaintiff's insurance through his employment.

Those amounts not

paid by this coverage will be paid eighty one (81%) percent by
Plaintiff and nineteen (19%) percent by Defendant.
5.

Random Drag Scans; Either party shall, at the request of

the other, and provided that party pays for the test, submit to
random drug scans.
6.

Child Support: Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the
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sum of $92.00 as and for child support.

Said amount shall be due

beginning February 1, 1997 and be payable one-half on or before the
5ch and one-half on or before the 20ch day of each month.
7. Medical Coverage: Plaintiff shall continue in full force
and effect all medical coverage available for the child.

Plaintiff

shall continue in full force and effect all medical coverage
available for Defendant until July 20, 1997.
In the event there are unpaid medical expenses incurred for
and on behalf of the minor child, Plaintiff shall pay 81% thereof
and Defendant shall pay 19%.
In the event the Defendant becomes employed, she shall provide
secondary medical coverage for the child and herself so long as it
is available at reasonable cost.
Unpaid medical, prescription, dental and other medical costs
for the child shall be paid eighty one (81%) percent by the
Plaintiff and nineteen (19%) percent by the Defendant.
8.

Tax Dependants: Plaintiff shall be allowed to purchase

from the Defendant the dependancy allowance of the child for tax
purposes.

The calculation of the amount to be paid by the

Plaintiff to the Defendant to secure the child as a dependant for
tax purposes shall be determined by utilizing the Defendant's
status as a single parent not on the basis of changed circumstances
in the event she remarries.
9.

Personal Property: Pre-marital or non-marital - Plaintiff:
A.

The Plaintiff

is hereby
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awarded

the following

property as premarital property free and clear of any claim of the
Defendant:
1. .308 rifle;
2. Browning .22 rifle;
3. .410 pump shotgun;
4. desk;
5. 1973 Dodge Charger;
6.
German dagger and sheath.
B.

The following items of personal property are either

not marital property or pre-marital property or property having
only nominal or sentimental value.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded any

interest that the parties may have in and to these items:
BB.
CC.
FF.
HH.
10.

Personal

Jumper Cables
1973 Dodge Charger
14x70 Nashua with chicken pens, etc.
Miscellaneous coins, silver bar
Property: The following

are two lists of

personal property:
A.

The following is list No. 1 and should be awarded to

Plaintiff unless otherwise designated -by Defendant except as may be
substituted by Defendant as indicated herein:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12,.
13.
14.
15.
16.

1 Dresser (1 dresser to Cory)
1 queen size bed
1 kitchen table and four chairs
Washer and dryer
55 gallon fish tank
3 end tables
Old dishes and flatware
Black couch and love seat
TV
Ruger .22 semi-auto rifle
SKS Rifle (1)
Bread maker
Five man tent
Weight bench
Plants (6)
Bicycle
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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
AA.
DD.
EE.
GG.
II.
JJ.
KK.
LL.
MM.
NN.
00.
PP.

Colt 380
Ruger Serai auto pistol
50 cassette tapes @ $8.00 ea
CD's 30 § $10.00 ea
Clock radio
Blender
Tool boxes
Miscellaneous tools
Blankets (4)
Vacuum
Utility trailer
Chevy truck
ATV
1973 Dodge Challenger
Bicycle
Miscellaneous Gun ammunition
Chickens
1 Chicken Incubator
2 red/blue mine lights + 2 base chrg
1 silver & gold wedding ring
1 almond whirlpool refrigerator
1 Sharp stereo w/2 large speakers
1 black file cabinet
1 Stand for fish tank
2 sand dune paddlewheel tires
2 men's 4-wheeler racing gloves
AT&T Telephone & Answering machine

B. The following is list No. 2 and should be awarded to
Defendant unless otherwise designated by Defendant except as may be
substituted by Defendant as above indicated:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Red plastic gas can
Large older radio and
phonograph in wood cabinet
Tools - socket set 3/8 drive
Wrenches - screwdrivers
Large box of childrenfs books (new)
Black metal rocking chair
Power drill
Space heater, bathroom scales (20
All records, titles, deeds, tax papers
receipts, etc.
Electric jeep (1) Three wheeler (1)
Blue sectional couch
Large home stereo in wood cabinet
Tan filing cabinet

cw

14. Four or five blankets
15. Two handmade quilts
16. 25 gallon fish tank
17. Cassette tapes (100 at $8.00 ea)
18. New Eureka vacuum
19. 15-20 video movies
20. New cassette player
21. Phone
22. Clock radio
23. New dishes
24. Green clean machine - carpet cleaner
25. Family pictures
26. Nice glasses
26. Glass bowls
27. New Smith-Corona Electronic typewriter
28. New silverware in wood box
29. Motorcycle helmet
30. Bushnell Binoculars
31. Minolta Camera
32. Hitachi Camcorder
33. Clothes hamper
34. Cordless phone
35. Battery charger
36. Bicycle
37. Answering machine
38. Flashlights (2)
39. Wall decorations
40. Cherry wood jewelry box
41. Captiva Camera
42. Christmas decorations
43. Ruger 989 9mm hand gun.
44. 12 gauge shot gun
45. Ruger 264 Magnum
46. Ruger Mini 14-223
47. Remington 22-250
48. RCA VCR
49. Oak coffee table
50. Towels - sheets, etc.
51. Plants and plant stands
(brass and glass)
52. Lamps
53. End tables
54. Kitchen table - four chairs
55. Microwave
56. Two dressers
57. Compact discs (120 § $10.00 ea)
58. Cannon 35 mm camera - 2 lenses and case
59. Miscellaneous gun ammo
60. Jumper cables
61. 1988 Pontiac Grand Am
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S.
T.
U.
W.
X.
Y.
Z.
AA.
BB.

12 Diamond Wedding Ring
4 Burial Plots
1 Blue Area Rug
1 baby book
$800.00 cash taken from car by Plaint.
1 black hills gold anniversary ring
1 Pioneer home stereo (in La Verkin)
2 sand dune paddlewheel tires
2 women's 4 wheeler racing gloves
1 Banshee ATV

11. Defendant to Select Items:

Defendant may select either

list and from the property listed in her non-selected list, she may
select six (6) items at the value indicated in the Findings of Fact
and substitute any six (6) items from her selected list to replace
the selected items.
12. Increase of Defendants Personal Property List: Whichever
list Defendant chooses shall be increased as follows:
A. Guns
Ruger 989 9mm hand gun
12 gauge shot gun
Ruger 264 Magnum
Ruger Mini 14-223

400.00
350.00
600.00
600.00

Remington 22-250

500.00
Total

B.

Pontiac Grand Am

$2,450.00
$3,000.00

13. Property Adiustment: To the extent that the Plaintiff
receives a greater value of personal property after the Defendant's
selection of the personal property as outlined above, the Plaintiff
shall be allowed a credit of one-half of the value of all of the
obligations he ultimately pays out-of-pocket against the personal
property list thereby reducing the value of his list, visa vie the
Defendant's list. This credit does not include insurance payments
-7-
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made for doctors and/or hospitalization by Plaintiff's insurance
carrier.
After all adjustments required hereby the party receiving the
greatest value of personal property shall pay to the other one-half
of the difference in value.
14. Cory's Property:

The following items are Cory's items and

shall remain with him:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

1 Dresser
Single Mattress
Sega and Games
Baby car seat
2 baseball bats
2 softball mitts
1 twin bed
1 baby swing
1 baby stroller
Large box of children's books
1 Crib (sold in 1992)
Cory's full size bed

15. Name Change: The Defendant's maiden name of Olsen is
hereby restored to her and she shall henceforth be known as "Lisa
D. Olsen*.
16.

Inheritance: All property and property rights vested in

either party as a result of family inheritance, trusts, or similar
sources is hereby awarded to the party from whose family it came.
17.

Documents: Each party shall execute and deliver to the

other any document necessary to implement the provisions of this
Decree.
18. Default: Should either party to this action default in any
obligation imposed by this Decree, the party in default shall be

-8-

0591

liable

to

the

other

for

all

reasonable

expenses,

including

attorney's fees and costs, incurred in the enforcement of the
obligations created by this Decree.
19. Restraining Order:
restrained

and

enjoined

The parties are hereby permanently

from

bothering,

harassing,

annoying,

threatening, or harming the other parent or the minor child at
their place of residence, employment, school, or any other place.
20. Debts;
A.

Plaintiff shall pay the following debts:
1. Zions Bank Mastercard
$2,237
2. Zions Bank Visa
1,100
3. Zions BAnk (Lumina)
9,000
4. ORS
5. Greentree Acceptance
6. Desert View Credit Union
(Grand Am Repair)
7. Desert View Credit Union
(Chevy Pickup)
8. Discover Card
9. Dr. Wayne Brown
10. Dr. Jeffery Palen
11. Southeastern Radiology
12. Leo Hardy
13. Utah Valley Medical Center
14. Castle View Hospital
15. Accounts Receivable Management
16. Any debt incurred by him after separation on July
28, 1995.

B.

The Defendant shall pay the following debts:
1.
2.
3.

Colonial Bank Mastercard
3,950;
Castleview Hospital
Any debt incurred by her after separation on July
28, 1995

4.

To the extent that doctor bills are not paid by

Plaintiff's insurance and to the extent that they were incurred
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after the date of separation (July 28, 1995) Defendant shall pay
same.
21. Real Property:

The real property and water shares are

hereby awarded to the Plaintiff subject to a lien in favor of the
Defendant

concerning

all

payments

required

hereby

from

the

Plaintiff to the Defendant. Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant
the sum of $3,240.00 as and for her interest in the real property.
22.

Loan:

The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant one-half

of the value of the amount withdrawn concerning the $8,500.00 loan
to be paid at the rate of $100.00 per month no interest to be
charged in the event the payments are made in timely fashion on or
before the 5th day of each month beginning with the month following
the Memorandum Decision.
23. Alimony:

Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of

$200.00 per month as and for alimony.

Said payment shall continue

for a period of five (5) years unless terminated earlier by order
of the Court or operation of law.
24. Retirement:

Plaintiff is hereby awarded free and clear of

any claim of the Defendant all of his retirement programs including
any and all withdrawals made during the marriage, specifically
including the $14,000.00 claimed by the Defendant.
25.

Life Insurance:

Plaintiff shall continue any life

insurance available to him through his employment on his life
naming the child as beneficiary until the child
majority.
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reaches his

26.

Dr. Burgess:

Plaintiff shall pay any balance due and

owing to Dr. Burgess.
27.

Attorney's Fees: Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as

and for attorney's fees t^r^sum of $5^000.00^
)?-f~Zfl^<-J

DATED this ^^y^fSiay of

, 1997.

BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
District Court

\div\daley\decree\sm
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER, #3619
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant,
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone (801) 637-1783
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DANNY P. DALEY,
)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)
;

Civil No. 970349CA

Plaintiff/APPELLANT

Vs.
LISA D. DALEY,
Defendant/APPELLEE,

I, John E. Schindler, hereby certify that on the 1 7 day of February, 1998,1 served
a copy of the REPLY OF APPELLANT upon Paul G. Amann, the counsel for the Appellee,
by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following
address:
9 Exchange Place, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this / 7

day of February, 1998.

